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ABSTRACT
Question: How does habitat destruction affect the evolution of cooperation?
Methods: Differential equations of the probabilities for different states in pairwise sites based
on the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in a regular network.
Key assumptions: Individuals play the Prisoner’s Dilemma game with other individuals
on directly connected (adjacent) sites. Individuals’ average payoff affects the birth rate. The
population undergoes a birth–death process. Habitat loss and fragmentation in the network
affect the population dynamics and the invasion and persistence of cooperation.
Predictions: (1) The evolution of cooperation is made possible through non-random
encounters in a spatially local process. (2) Derive a spatial Hamilton rule whereby the
proportion of cooperators among the neighbouring individuals of a cooperator serves the same
role of relatedness as in kin selection, which is consistent with other forms of Hamilton rules.
(3) The evolution of cooperation becomes easier in harsh environments. (4) The co-existence of
multiple strategies in a species can maintain population size at a constant level.
Keywords: evolutionary game, habitat loss, invasion analysis, pair approximation,
Prisoner’s Dilemma.
INTRODUCTION
The evolution of cooperation and altruism remains a conundrum in biology and social
science (Doebeli and Hauert, 2005). Cooperative individuals benefit others at personal cost and are
easily exploited by other, selfish individuals (defectors). Therefore, cooperative behaviour
is not an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and fosters incompatibility with Darwinian
natural selection. Nonetheless, examples of cooperation abound in nature, both between
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and within species, ranging from microbial interactions to the behaviour of complex
organisms (Wilkinson, 1984; Sella, 1985; Pierce et al., 1987; Hemelrijk, 1990, 1991; Lombardo, 1990; Noe, 1990;
Hauser, 1992). This contrast between theoretical prediction and empirical evidence begets
the paradox of cooperation. Specifically, this paradox centres on two questions: (1) how
altruism emerges in a selfish population through natural selection, and (2) how the
cooperators, once successfully invaded, can withstand the deceitful individuals in the
population.
Three theories, namely group selection, kinship, and (direct-, indirect-, and network-)
reciprocity, have been proposed for the evolution of cooperation (for a review, see Nowak, 2006).
The mathematical essence of reciprocal cooperation can be incorporated into a Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, which has been considered as a paradigm for tackling the evolution of
altruism (e.g. Trivers, 1971; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). A Prisoner’s Dilemma game describes
a pairwise interaction between players with different behavioural strategies (either to
cooperate or to defect). According to the game theory of Nash equilibrium and replicator
equations (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998), it is better to defect in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game
irrespective of the opponent’s decision. A cooperative society is therefore impossible even
though mutual cooperators receive a higher payoff than mutual defectors, posing a social
dilemma (Axelrod, 1984).
A key factor that leads to this paradox of cooperation is the mean-field assumption – that
is, the game is played in a well-mixed population without individual identity. As a result,
any mechanisms that can break this mean-field assumption will inevitably lead to the
invasion and persistence of the altruistic behaviour. Theories such as group selection
(Wilson, 1975), kin selection (Hamilton, 1963, 1964a, 1964b), reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), and spatial
game theory (Nowak and May, 1992) can break this mean-field assumption and create
non-random encounters [known as assortment in game theory (Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza, 1982)].
Specifically, in a spatial game, an individual is restricted to interact only with its direct
neighbours, indicating that the spatial structure of the playground (i.e. the habitat structure
of species) can have a potential effect on the evolution of cooperation (Nowak and May,
1992; Sigmund, 1992; Huberman and Glance, 1993; Szabo and Toke, 1998; Nowak and Sigmund, 2000). An important
process in creating spatial changes in the playground is habitat destruction (loss and
fragmentation). Habitat destruction is the principal threat to the long-term survival of
species, both locally and globally (Tilman et al., 1994; Wilcove et al., 1998). Therefore, it is not only
of intrinsic value but also of applied significance to examine how habitat destruction affects
(1) the dynamics of Prisoner’s Dilemma games and (2) the condition for cooperators
to invade a selfish population successfully.
In a canonical spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma game, spatial saturation (i.e. no empty sites) is
assumed (Nowak and May, 1992; Szabo and Toke, 1998; but see Alizon and Taylor, 2008). To examine the effect
of habitat destruction on the invasion and persistence of cooperation in a Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, we extended the canonical spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma game in two ways:
(1) empty sites due to demographic stochasticity and (ii) spatially non-random (clustered)
unsuitable sites due to habitat destruction. This extended game was then expressed using
differential equations and analysed by pair approximation (Iwasa, 2000) and numerical
simulations. The invasion condition of cooperative behaviour in a selfish population and
the population dynamics, under different spatial structures of habitat destruction, were
examined. A general spatial Hamilton rule was developed.
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MODEL
Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma game
In a regular network where each site connects to a number of sites n (defined as its neigh-
bourhood), each site can be categorized as either suitable or unsuitable. The existence of
unsuitable sites represents habitat destruction. The global density of unsuitable sites (pE)
indicates the probability that a randomly chosen site is unsuitable, and the local density of
unsuitable sites (qE |E) indicates the probability that a randomly chosen neighbour of an
unsuitable site is also unsuitable. These two probabilities measure the level of habitat loss
and fragmentation. A random habitat destruction can be described by pE = qE |E, a spatially
clustered habitat destruction by pE < qE |E, and a spatially segregated habitat destruction by
pE > qE |E (Hui et al., 2006, in press). An inequality qE |E ≥ 2 − 1/pE defines the feasible region of these
two probabilities (Hiebeler, 2000). Overall, there are four states for each site: C (occupied by a
cooperator), D (occupied by a defector), H (suitable but empty), and E (unsuitable).
In a Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the two players simultaneously decide whether to
cooperate or to defect during an encounter. A cooperator yields a benefit b to its opponent
at a cost to itself c (b > c); a defector yields no benefit but suffers no cost. This leads to the










Let µ and δ denote the birth and death rate respectively, where Ω is either C or D. We
assumed that only the birth rate is affected by the payoff in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game,
whereas the death rate is the same for both strategies (δC = δD = δ). The offspring is
located in an empty but suitable neighbouring site around its haploid parent. As a result, the
birth rate equals the intrinsic birth rate (µ0) plus the average payoffs of the individual
(Le Galliard et al., 2003):
µC = µ0 + (1 − φ)((b − c)qC |C − c ·qD |C)
, (2)
µD = µ0 + (1 − φ)b ·qC |D
where φ = 1/n and q| represents the conditional probability that a randomly chosen
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where p is the probability that a randomly chosen pairwise site is in state ΩΩ; q|″ is
the conditional probability that a randomly chosen neighbour of the Ω-site in a ΩΩ″
pair is a Ω-site; and Ω in the last part of equation (3) is the opponent strategy to Ω (i.e. if
Ω = C, then Ω = D). Parameters α and β are α= (1 − φ)µ and β= φµ+ (1 − φ) µq|H,
respectively. According to pair approximation (Iwasa, 2000), we let q|″ = q|, indicating
that the probability of finding a Ω-site next to a Ω-site does not depend on the state of its
other neighbour (Ω″). Thus all conditional probabilities in the above equations can be
calculated according to the probability theory, p = pq|.
Spatial Hamilton rule
To examine the effect of habitat destruction on the invasion condition of the cooperative
strategy in a selfish population, we calculated the spatial invasion fitness of cooperation,
i.e. the rate of per capita increase for the initial rare cooperators in a selfish population
at equilibrium. When a selfish population is at equilibrium, probabilities p and
q| (Ω, Ω = D, H, E) are constant. The conditional probabilities qC |D and qC |H equal
zero. Therefore, the invasion dynamics of cooperation is controlled by four equations
regarding the pairwise probabilities pCC, pCD, pCH, and pCE (see equation 3). We can
then rewrite equation (3) in matrix form, dPC /dt = M(QC)PC, where PC is a vector PC = (pCC,
pCD, pCH, pCE)


































This matrix depends on the local-density vector QC = (qC |C, qD |C, qH |C, qE |C)
T. When
cooperative individuals invade a selfish population, the local-density vector QC rapidly
reaches a pseudo-equilibrium, while the global density of the population and defectors
remain unchanged (Ferriere and Le Galliard, 2001). In general, the pseudo-equilibrium of the
local-density vector QC can be calculated by solving M(QC)QC = λ ·QC, where λ is the
dominant eigenvalue of matrix M(QC) and is a measure of spatial invasion fitness (van Baalen
and Rand, 1998; Ferriere and Le Galliard, 2001). The cooperative individuals can invade a selfish
population if λ is positive. The condition λ = 0 defines an invasion boundary. Therefore,
we have the following condition for the invasion of cooperation:
qC |C
qC |C + qD |C
·b > c. (4)
This condition is a spatial form of the Hamilton rule in the context of a spatial Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. The proportion of cooperators among the neighbouring individuals of a
cooperator, qC |C /(qC |C + qD |C), is analogous to: the genetic relatedness between individuals
in kinship selection (Hamilton, 1964a, 1964b; Maynard Smith, 1964); the probability of having
another round of the game, as in direct reciprocity (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981); the probability of
knowing the social score of the opponent, as in indirect reciprocity (Nowak and Sigmund 1998);
and the average degree of nodes, as in graph selection (Ohtsuki et al., 2006; for a review, see Nowak, 2006).
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Equation (4) demonstrates an invasion condition that depends on the spatial correlation (or
local density) of cooperative individuals (qC |C) and the spatial attraction of cooperators
to defectors (qD |C) at their pseudo-equilibrium. Therefore, the local spatial structure of
different strategies at the pseudo-equilibrium (QC) determines the dynamics of cooperation
invasion.
To demonstrate the above analysis of the spatial Hamilton rule and the effect of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game on the population dynamics when facing habitat destruction
(loss and fragmentation), we provide two numerical solutions. First, because the pseudo-
equilibrium of the local-density vector QC is difficult to calculate due to the non-linearity of
the above system, we present a numerical solution for the threshold of altruistic cost (c)
under different levels of habitat loss and fragmentation when the altruistic benefit is fixed
(b = 1). Second, the above invasion analysis and the spatial Hamilton rule (equation 4) only
provide a condition for cooperation to invade a selfish population. The analysis does not
indicate the dynamics of cooperators and populations after the invasion, especially when
facing habitat destruction. Therefore, by solving equation (3) numerically, we can reveal the
long-term dynamics of the population.
RESULTS
The spatial structure of the habitat (or the playground) affected the threshold for the
invasion of cooperation (Fig. 1). First, with an increase in the proportion of unsuitable sites
in the habitat (pE), the threshold of the altruistic cost (c) for cooperation invasion increased,
indicating a wider window of possibility for cooperation invasion (Fig. 1). Second, with
a decrease in clustering of habitat destruction (i.e. increasing habitat fragmentation,
measured by qE |E), the threshold for cooperation invasion increased (Fig. 1). This effect of
habitat fragmentation on widening the window of possibility for cooperation invasion
became more conspicuous when the habitat loss was high (Fig. 1). Therefore, habitat
destruction, in general, can facilitate the successful invasion of cooperation in a spatial
Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
A further examination of the population size (at equilibrium) under different levels of
habitat loss and fragmentation revealed interesting results (Fig. 2). First, the habitat con-
nectivity, as described by the number of neighbouring sites of a focal site (n), had a negative
impact on the persistence of both cooperators and the population (compare Fig. 2a and
2b). The parameter zones for cooperation–defection co-existence and pure cooperation, as
projected on the pE − qE |E plane at the bottom of the figure, shrank when connectivity was
enhanced (from n = 4 in Fig. 2a to n = 8 in Fig. 2b). Interestingly, there was a parameter
zone for pure cooperation, implying that it is possible for cooperators to expel defectors
completely just before the population goes extinct (Fig. 2). In addition, the decline
in population size due to habitat destruction was almost halted and even reversed for
some parameters in the parameter zone of co-existence, in contrast to the fast decline in
population size with pure strategies (i.e. all individuals are either cooperators or defectors).
This result suggests that multiple behavioural strategies within a population could be an
efficient way to deal with habitat destruction.
In contrast to the above result that population size was more sensitive to changes in
habitat structure in the pure-strategy parameter zone, the effect of the cost (c) and benefit
(b) in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game on population size provided a different picture
(Fig. 3a). Population size became highly sensitive in the parameter zone of co-existence,
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whereas it remained constant when all individuals were defectors. The effect of the birth
rate (µ0) and death rate (δ) on population size (Fig. 3b) produced relatively similar results
to the effect of habitat destruction (Fig. 2). Population size remained constant in the
parameter zone of co-existence regardless of the birth and death rates, whereas it fell
sharply in the pure-strategy parameter zone with the increase/decrease of the death/birth
rate (Fig. 3b).
DISCUSSION
Four propositions arise from the results of this study: (1) the evolution of cooperation is
made possible in the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma game by assortment in spatially local
processes; (2) the spatial Hamilton rule (equation 4) derived is consistent with other forms
of Hamilton rules; (3) the invasion and persistence of cooperation become easier in a harsh
Fig. 1. Cost threshold for successful cooperation invasion in a selfish population under different levels
of habitat loss (pE) and fragmentation (qE |E). Parameter zones separated by lines indicate, from the
upper right-hand corner on the pE − qE |E plane, unfeasible, extinction, and persistence. Parameters are
µ0 = 1, n = 4, b = 1, and δ = 0.2.
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environment; and (4) the co-existence of multiple strategies in a species provides an efficient
way to deal with environmental stress. In the following, we discuss these four propositions in
detail.
First, since Axelrod (1984), spatial games have been thoroughly investigated (Nowak and May,
1992; Nowak and Sigmund, 2000; Doebeli and Hauert, 2005), with increasing complexity and reality in
modelling rules (Huberman and Glance, 1993; Nowak et al., 1994; Dieckmann et al., 2000). One conclusion
of these studies was that the spatial structure of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game can indeed
promote the evolution of cooperation (Nowak and Sigmund, 2000) even though disagreement
remains on the details. Cooperators survive by forming clusters within which they obtain
the benefit of mutual cooperation, which balances the exploitation by selfish individuals
around these clusters (Doebeli and Hauert, 2005). The spatial structure of local processes is still the
main mechanism here that leads to the evolution of cooperation because the Prisoner’s
Fig. 2. The effect of habitat loss (pE) and fragmentation (qE |E) on population size at equilibrium. The
parameter zones of unfeasible, extinction, pure cooperators, pure defectors, and co-existence are
projected on the pE − qE |E plane. Parameters are µ0 = 0.2, δ = 0.1, b = 1, c = 0.36, n = 4 for (a) and n = 8
for (b).
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Dilemma game inhibits the persistence of cooperation under the mean-field assumption
(Hauert and Szabo, 2005; Hui et al., 2005). By breaking this assumption and introducing some
assortment into the game (here by reducing the number of neighbouring sites from infinite
as in the mean-field assumption to only four and eight; Fig. 2), we can expect the successful
invasion and persistence of cooperation and even a population with pure cooperators.
Second, the Hamilton rule, as in its initial form in kin selection theory (Hamilton, 1964a, 1964b),
states that the cooperation strategy should be selectively favoured if the recipient’s benefit
(b) weighted by the relatedness (r) of the altruists is greater than the altruistic cost (c), rb > c.
It is often suggested that kin selection should operate in a viscous population, in which local
dispersal promotes interactions among relatives because offspring tend to remain close to
their parents. Similar conditions exist in the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma game (van Baalen and
Fig. 3. (a) The effect of the benefits (b) and costs (c) to cooperate, and (b) the effect of the birth rate
(µ0) and death rate (δ) on population size at equilibrium. The parameter zones of unfeasible,
extinction, pure cooperators, pure defectors, and co-existence are projected on the pE − qE |E plane.
Parameters are µ0 = 0.3, δ = 0.2, pE − qE |E = 0 and n = 8 for (a), and pE − qE |E = 0.1, b = 1, c = 0.36 and
n = 8 for (b).
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Rand, 1998; Le Galliard et al., 2003; Doebeli and Hauert, 2005). We also derived a Hamilton rule in the
spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma game (equation 4). Clearly, the proportion of cooperators
among the neighbouring individuals of a cooperator (equation 4) serves the same function
as relatedness (r) in kinship selection. As mentioned above, both introduce assortment into
the game and make the evolution of cooperation possible (Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza, 1982).
Third, spatial saturation (all sites are occupied) is often assumed in spatial games (Axelrod,
1984; Nowak and May, 1992; Huberman and Glance, 1993; Nowak et al., 1994; Lindgren and Nordahl, 1994; Nowak and
Sigmund, 2000). This is the same as the frequency of cooperation within a constant population,
even though it is impossible to maintain spatial saturation under strong environmental
pressure due to enhanced demographic stochasticity (Tilman and Kareiva, 1997; Hanksi, 1998).
However, we studied evolution of cooperation in a dynamic population and allowed empty
sites through both demographic stochasticity and habitat destruction. Although empty sites
due to demographic stochasticity have been shown to promote the evolution of cooperation
(Taylor, 1992; Queller, 1992, 1994; Le Galliard et al., 2003), no previous research has focused on a dynamic
population in partially suitable habitat due to habitat destruction. Clearly, habitat
destruction can promote the evolution of cooperation and even eliminate defectors from the
population just before it goes extinct (Fig. 2). Moreover, demographic stochasticity (by
increasing the mortality δ and decreasing the birth rate µ0) has also been shown to promote
the evolution of cooperation (Fig. 3b). Overall, a harsh environment, indicated by high
levels of habitat destruction and demographic stochasticity, promotes the evolution of
cooperation (Hui et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2005).
Finally, habitat destruction is widely accepted as the main threat to biodiversity
conservation (Tilman et al., 1994; Wilcove et al., 1998). However, a very complicated situation
was found here for populations with multiple strategies (i.e. when cooperation and defection
co-exist within the population). A population can mitigate the damage from habitat
destruction by adjusting its proportion of cooperators and defectors within and, as a result,
the population size will remain constant regardless of the intensity of habitat destruction
(Hui et al., 2005). This self-regulating ability of species (or systems) with multiple interrelated
strategies in dealing with environmental changes has also been demonstrated in Lovelock’s
daisy world (for a review, see Wood et al., 2008). We believe further research is worthy on
how behavioural strategies shift in social animals when they are faced with environmental
stress.
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